It is normal for clients to make representations in contracts, agreements and discoveries in litigation. These representations can be found in transaction agreements, agreements for the purchase and sale of residential and commercial properties, responses to inquiries and guarantees. Representations can occur in many ways, including in binding agreements. However, writing a contract for a client does not make the lawyer responsible for the accuracy of the paper statements. The lawyer writes the statements that the parties to the agreement intend to make. This article will examine these situations and explain why lawyers are not responsible for their clients' statements in contracts, agreements and throughout litigation. With each aspect of the dispute, lawyers represent clients who may have a different degree of commercial and legal knowledge. Some clients have never before been litigated and rely entirely on their lawyers' advice on strategy, while others, particularly in complex commercial disputes or malpractice cases, have significant experience in the field. In both cases, clients make representations to both their lawyer and their opponent that will support their position in a case or contract. These statements may include the solvency of the client in connection with the sale of real estate, representations made in the settlement process of a case or representations made in marriage contracts. However, lawyers, when drafting documents, are not necessarily responsible for the representations made by the client. As Judge Chesler noted in Wiebel c. Morris, Downing & Sherred, 2009 Dist. U.S. 46088 LEXIS (D.J., June 2, 2009), aff'd, (3rd Cir., June 10, 2010): To find the opposite would create a new category of responsibility of the legal profession: it would impose on a lawyer an obligation of diligence with regard to all the contents of the agreements which he writes. , and lawyers would effectively become the guarantors of each performance when commemorating agreements. WiebelFlaherty became engaged to Paul Wiebel in 1998. At the time, Flaherty lived in New York and Wiebel in Bernardsville, New Jersey. Wiebel suggested buying a multi-tenant property in New York that could serve as a Flaherty residence and generate rental income. Flaherty then rented an apartment that she made live. Wiebel created 50 West 86th Street, LLC (the "entity") to purchase the property. A lawyer, a longtime friend and Wiebel partner at Wiebel's request, drafted a will, power of attorney and a health care directive. for Flaherty. He forwarded drafts of these documents to Flaherty on February 22, 1999. In addition, in October 1999, the lawyer had done preliminary work regarding a bodily injury that Flaherty had suffered, but Flaherty had decided not to pursue the case. will be married on September 25, 1999, but on August 26, 1999, Flaherty ends their engagement. Flaherty and Wiebel then became engaged for the second time on April 21, 2001, and were planning to marry on September 1, 2001. In August 2001, Wiebel submitted a marriage contract to Flaherty which stipulated that Flaherty owned 49% of the entity and that Wiebel owned 51 percent. He predicted that once Flaherty and Wiebel were married, Wiebel would give Flaherty an additional 1% interest, so they would each own 50% of the entity. However, Wiebel actually owned 99% of the entity and the last percent belonged to Wiebel's son. Wiebel told Flaherty that the lawyer who drafted the document acted solely on his behalf and that she should not contact him about this agreement. Flaherty was represented by a separate solicitor during the prenuptial agreement negotiation. On August 28, 2001, Flaherty signed the prenuptial agreement. The couple was married on September 1, 2001. Nearly four years later, on November 31, 2005, Wiebel filed a divorce suit that was finalized on November 8, 2006, when Wiebel and Flaherty signed the lawsuit. a transaction agreement. After signing this agreement, Flaherty filed a lawsuit in a district court against the lawyer originally drafting the settlement agreement, alleging that she (Flaherty) was at a disadvantage in the divorce negotiations because the prenuptial agreement gave a false representation of his participation in the entity. In response, Counsel stated that where a lawyer prepares a document that establishes a written agreement between the parties, the statements contained in the written agreement do not constitute a statement or misrepresentation made by that counsel, within the meaning of Banco Popular N. Am. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161 (2005) .The District Court of Wiebel had to decide whether the plaintiff Flaherty had invoked a lawsuit for misrepresentation within the meaning of Banco Popular. In ruling on this case, the District Court referred to the Black's Law Dictionary, where the "representation" is defined as follows: "A statement of fact – either in words or by conduct – made to incite someone to do so". one to act, in particular. Conclude a contract; in particular, the manifestation to another than a fact, including a state of mind, exists. Black & # 39; s Law Dictionary (8 th ed. 2004). Representing is not simply sending information to another person, but is acting to influence that other person. Wiebel, the plaintiff, Flaherty, alleged that the lawyer had sent information in writing an agreement, but not that the lawyer had acted in this way to influence the plaintiff. She alleged that the lawyer "knew or ought to have known that the plaintiff would rely on the submissions of the defendant 's counsel". However, the District Court ruled that the plaintiff had not alleged any intentional action. The district court noted that the plaintiff had only alleged that the lawyer had already represented her, that she knew her socially, and had drafted an agreement to which she was a party. The District Court found that this was insufficient to infer that the lawyer invited the complainant to invoke the plaintiff's confidence, or that it gave her a right of recourse above a level of speculation. On appeal of the third circuit, the court of New Jersey found the law does not recognize a cause of action for breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and that the case did not allow a claim based on the limited obligations of the lawyer to non-clients, since the drafting of the prenuptial agreement was not a situation in which a client would have reasonably relied on the statements of the lawyer .Wiebel, and its procedural history, is important in the context of the responsibility of the public prosecutor for the representations made by his client. The holding of the district court in Wiebel is also followed by other jurisdictions. For example, in New York, the editorial attorney is not necessarily responsible for fraudulent statements made by his client in a written contract. See, Gansett One v. Husch Blackwell, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4517 (quoting, Jordan Inv. Co. v. Hunter Green Invs., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5182 (SD NY, March 31, 2003)) (applying the New York law and finding that the lawyer made no erroneous statement while the only allegation was that the defendant had prepared the allegedly fraudulent drafts on behalf of its clients). See also, Friedman c. Hartmann, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3404 (SD NY, 22 March 1994) (noting that "the agent does not generally sign a contract that he prepares for his client, since the statements and undertakings set out in the document are made by him and are binding on him". In addition, in Pennsylvania, a lawyer has the right to rely in good faith on the facts presented to him by the client and is not required to open an investigation to verify that statement before giving an opinion on this subject. Meiksin c. Howard Hanna Co., 404 Pa. Super. 417 (Pa.Super Ct., 1991) (finding that if the client falsifies the facts, there may be a liability that weighs on the client, but not on the lawyer if he acts in good faith on the facts stated by the client); see also. Kit v. Mitchell, 2001 PA Super. 94 (Super Pa.Ct 2001). Practitioners should remember that the lawyer only records in writing the statements that the parties to the agreement intend to make to each other. A lawyer who enters into a contract between two parties does not guarantee the statements that one or the other of the parties made to each other. Writing does not make the lawyer responsible for the accuracy of paper statements. To conclude otherwise would create a whole new category of liability for the legal profession: it would impose on lawyers a duty of care for all the content of the agreements they would draft and lawyers would effectively become the guarantors of each representation when memorizing agreements. The scope of the third party's liability for the drafting of documents is limited, and the courts, both federal and federal, have not allowed such a broad extension of the rules of professional liability to Lawyer who simply drafts documents in which clients have made representations. One and the other. John "Jack" Slimm is lead counsel and Jeremy J. Zacharias is a partner in Marshall Dennehey's professional liability department, Warner Coleman & Goggin in Mount Laurel.